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Abstract 
Using a dynamic model of unionism and wage determination we find that the unobserved factors that 
influence union membership also affect wages. We observe a significant decline in trade union 
membership persistence during the period under analysis. We find that UK trade unions still play a non-
negligible, albeit diminishing, role in wage formation. While unions were unable to establish a wage 
premium for male members during the two periods considered, the female union wage effect stood at 
(19.4%, 17.6%) during (1991-1996, 1997-2002) respectively. The endogeneity correction procedure 
employed yields a discernible pattern of the union wage effect relative to OLS and fixed effects thus, 
refuting the pessimistic conclusions reached by Freeman and Medoff (1982) and Lewis (1986) that 
endogeneity correction methodologies do not contribute to our understanding of the union wage effect 
puzzle. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE JOINT DETERMINATION OF UNION STATUS
AND UNION WAGE EFFECTS
In the past decade few studies were dedicated to the topic of trade union wage
di¤erentials in the UK. Most authors became disinterested in the topic in that
trade unions are currently viewed as having little relevance in the process of wage
formation.
The successive anti-union (1980, 1982, 1988, 1990) Employment Acts and the
consequent dramatic decline in aggregate trade union membership and recognition
led to a fall in unionsbargaining power and a signicant decline in union wage
premia (see for instance Stewart, 1995).
Furthermore, as the simultaneous determination of union membership status
and union wage di¤erentials complicates the identication of the union wage impact,
some authors (e.g. Swa¢ eld, 2001; Blanchower and Bryson, 2010) disregarded the
potential pitfalls of employing a selection on observables approach and ignoring the
problem of endogeneity.
It is hard to conceptualise a realistic scenario in which the unobserved determi-
nants of the unionisation decision would not a¤ect wages. We cannot readily ignore
to encompass how the unobserved individual heterogeneity underlying the union
membership decision is rewarded (see Robinson, 1989a; Vella and Verbeek, 1998).
We therefore estimate union wage di¤erentials employing a selection on un-
observables methodology and longitudinal data from the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) spanning the period of (1991-2003).
The general consensus by many researchers in the past was that cross-sectional
OLS analyses of the union wage e¤ect are contaminated by the selectivity of union
sector employees inating the union wage e¤ect (see Abowd and Farber, 1982;
Freeman, 1984).
While there was little disagreement that union membership status is not ex-
ogenous (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Duncan and Leigh, 1985; Robinson, 1989a) authors
such as Freeman and Medo¤ (1982) and Lewis (1986) have reached the pessimistic
conclusion that there is no discernible pattern to the estimates of the union wage
impact, many were considered to be suspiciously high or low, and endogeneity cor-
rection methodologies have contributed little to our understanding of the union
wage di¤erential puzzle (Robinson, 1989a, p.640).
Upon summarising the then existing literature Robinson (1989a) concludes that
the outcome is conicting: endogeneity correction methods (such as Inverse Mills
Ratio and Instrumental Variables) produced an upward adjustment as opposed to
OLS, whereas longitudinal (di¤erencing) methods produced a downward adjust-
ment (Robinson, 1989a, p.640).
Though, some researchers employing longitudinal data sets attribute the result-
ing reduction in the union wage e¤ect to xed e¤ects of higher quality workers
present within the unionised sector this is not consistent with studies employing
IMR or IVE methods to deal with such e¤ects (Robinson, 1989, p.658).
Estimation of union wage di¤erentials using longitudinal data requires control-
ling for the endogeneity of union membership status. Fixed e¤ects and Instrumental
Variables estimators (e.g. Hausman and Taylor, 1981) assume that this endogene-
ity is individual-specic and xed and are thus restrictive in their treatment of
unobserved heterogeneity (see Robinson 1989a,b; Vella and Verbeek 1999a).
Thus, we adopt a version of the estimation methodology o¤ered by Vella and
Verbeek (1998, 1999b) that explicitly identies the di¤erent sources of endogeneity
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of union membership status.
We wish to establish whether UK trade unions still play a role in wage formation
following the introduction of the successive Employment Acts targeted towards
weakening their bargaining strength. We are interested in estimating the degree
of true structural persistence of union membership. Further, we are interested
in exploring the role of unobserved individual heterogeneity in the unionisation
decision and the manner in which it is rewarded. Finally, we wish to investigate
whether the economic sorting structure governing the entry into the two sectors
provides a discernible pattern of the endogeneity corrected estimates relative to the
uncorrected estimates of the union wage e¤ect.
The empirical results indicate that trade unions in the UK still play a non-
negligible, albeit diminishing, role in wage formation. We observe a signicant
decline in trade union membership persistence during the period under analysis.
While unions failed to establish a union wage di¤erential for their male members,
the estimated female union impact still remains signicant. Finally, the endogeneity
correction procedure employed yields a discernible pattern of the estimated union
wage impact relative to OLS and xed e¤ects. This is in line with Robinson (1989a)
and refutes the pessimistic conclusions reached by Freeman and Medo¤ (1982) and
Lewis (1986) in their inuential surveys.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the econometric
model; Section 3 the estimation procedure; Section 4 analyses the estimation results;
and nally Section 5 concludes.
2. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF UNIONISM AND WAGE DETERMINATION
Equation (1) outlines the primary wage equation and assumes that individuals
sort themselves into their preferred sector (union/non-union) on the basis of wages
which are determined by observed and unobserved attributes and their respective
prices. The potential wage corresponding to individual i employed in sector j,
in time period t is given by wj;it. The non-unionised and unionised sectors are
denoted by j = f0; 1g respectively,  is an unknown parameter vector and xit
is the conventional vector of personal and industrial characteristics which is also
inclusive of time dummies. The unobserved random components of the employees
wage are given by (j;i; "j;it) and the usual error component structure assumes
j;i s iidN(0; 2) and "j ;its iidN(0; 2"):
wj;it = 
0
j;txit + j;i + "j;it (1)
t = 1; :::; T ; i = 1; :::; N ; j = f0; 1g
Employment within a unionised establishment is also contingent on the em-
ployers willingness to hire him/her (see Abowd and Farber, 1982). The major
limitation of the estimation methodology employed here is that it does not suf-
ciently control for employer characteristics while on the other hand, individual
employees attributes are allowed to be an integral part of the employers deci-
sion making process. While in the estimated models presented employer attributes
are captured through the industrial classication dummies and establishment size
controls these are not adequate in order to assign any specic e¤ects purely to
unobserved heterogeneity.
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The dynamic reduced form model depicting the decision of an individual to join
either the unionised or non-unionised sector is provided in equation (2). The bene-
ts of employment within the unionised sector are captured by the latent variable
Uit. The union membership status of an individual i in period t, is indicated by
the dummy variable Uit.
The unknown parameters to be estimated are (01; 2)
0 and the composite error
term it captures the unobserved individual heterogeneity underlying the union
membership decision and is decomposed into an individual-specic component #i
and an individual time-specic e¤ect it. The logarithm of the gross average hourly
wage rate (log of weekly wage divided by usual paid hours including overtime) is
denoted by wit:
Uit = 
0
1xit + 2Ui;t 1 + #i + it (2)
Uit = I(U

it i 0)
wit = wj;it if Uit = j
Denote ej;it= j;i + "j;it and it = #i + it, let i be a T vector of it and
xi = [xi1; :::; xiT ]
0. Assuming that:
i j xi  iidN(0; 2#ii0 + 2I) (3)
Efej;it j xi;ig = 1it + 2  i (4)
where
 
 i =
1
T
PT
t=1 it, i is a T dimensional vector of ones and (1; 2) are
unknown constants to be estimated.
Expression (3) enforces normality and a strict error components structure on
the reduced form model for union membership and precludes any form of autocor-
relation in it while equation (4) permits heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in
"j;it but imposes the strict exogeneity of xit.3
Potential seniority and non-pecuniary benets can be su¢ ciently strong mo-
tives for individuals to remain within the unionised sector, irrespective of wage
changes, and this introduces state dependence in the model (see Vella and Verbeek,
1998). The inclusion of a lagged union membership status variable in the reduced
form model prevents the error components from incorrectly capturing the dynamics
which should be credited to lagged union membership.4
The random components (j;i; i), ("j;it; it) in equations (1; 2) denote the
individual-specic and the individual/time-specic e¤ects respectively. It is as-
sumed that these are independently and identically distributed drawings from a
multivariate normal distribution, where every e¤ect is potentially correlated with
its counterpart, of the same dimension, in the other equation. More specically
the four covariances (j;; j;") are allowed to be non-zero.5 These covariances
indicate that the random components in the wage equation are potentially corre-
lated with the random components in the union membership equation and this is
3Note that testing for non-normality in the reduced form model for union membership can be
quite di¢ cult computationally.
4 It is not possible to include dynamics coming through the lagged dependent variable in the
wage equation. Arellano et al (1997) propose an alternative estimator, constrained to models
with Tobit types of censoring, that permits for lagged latent dependent variables to enter both
the primary and reduced form equations linearly.
5The covariances between the e¤ects in the union/ non-union wage equations are not specied,
whereas all remaining covariances are set to zero.
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precisely what produces the potential endogeneity of union membership status in
the primary equation.
The covariances convey valuable information about the form of sorting into the
two sectors (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999a). Note that the i are constructed so that
their average value for union employees is positive while their average value for non-
union employees is negative. For tractability assume that the endogeneity is taken
to operate purely via the individual-specic e¤ects (j;i; i). In the case that either
covariance between (; ) is non-zero then the unobserved factors that determine
union membership inuence wages as well (and similarly if either covariance between
("j;it; it) is non-zero).
A hierarchical sorting structure requires that both covariances are positive
(1;0>0) so that individuals with high values of  are, on average, the best em-
ployees in terms of their endowment of unobserved productivity, irrespective of
whether they are located in the union or non-union sector (and vice-versa).
A comparative advantage (or positive sorting structure) requires that employees
perform di¤erently in the two sectors and sort themselves appropriately (1;0<0).
This implies a negative association between the relative productivity in the two
sectors and demands that the contribution of unobserved heterogeneity raises wages
in both sectors (i.e. 1;>0; 0;<0).6
Note that solely a degenerate hierarchical structure, imposing perfect correlation
between sector-specic skills, can meet the strict and restrictive requirement of the
equality of the two covariances imposed by either of the Instrumental Variables or
the restricted Control Function estimators. A comparative advantage structure is
precluded a priori (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999a).
To estimate the union wage di¤erential we enforce the restriction that the re-
turns to observed characteristics are both time and sector invariant. The wage
equation (eq:1) then becomes:
wit = 
0xit + Uit + eit (5)
eit = Uit(1;i + "1;it) + (1  Uit)(0;i + "0;it)
3. ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Following Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999b) we start with equation (5) which
is made conditional on the t-dimensional vector Ui, and the vector of exogenous
variables xit:
E(wit j xit; Ui) = 0E(xitj xit; Ui)+E(Uitj xit; Ui)+E(j;ij xit; Ui)+E("j;itj xit; Ui)
(6)
Estimation of the reduced form model for union membership (eq:2), provides
the estimates of the unobserved individual heterogeneity (see Appendix II). This is
a dynamic random e¤ects Probit model with a likelihood function:

i
Z

t


0	it + i

Uit


 
0	it + i

1 Uit 1

(=)d (7)
where,  = (01; 2)
0, 	it = [xit; Ui;t 1], and (; ) correspond to the cumulative
probability and density functions of the standard Normal distribution.
6Note that 1;0 cannot be estimated directly.
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The inclusion of the lagged union membership variable as a regressor in (eq:2)
gives rise to the problem of initial conditions (refer to Heckman, 1981a). The initial
conditions problem occurs when the initial value of the dependent variable is corre-
lated with unobserved individual heterogeneity. The presence of individual-specic
e¤ects i clearly invalidates the assumption of exogeneity of union membership
status in the rst period.
The initial conditions problem cannot be readily ignored since the random ef-
fects maximum likelihood estimator in its standard form will be inconsistent (see
Heckman, 1981a,b). Further, ignoring the correlation between individual-specic
e¤ects #i and the initial conditions will overstate the degree of state dependence.
We employ Wooldridge´s (2005) solution to the initial conditions problem. This
involves modelling the distribution of the unobserved e¤ect conditional on the initial
value and the observed history of strictly exogenous explanatory variables (see
Appendix I).
The last two conditional expectations in (eq:6) are estimates of the unobserved
heterogeneity and can be expressed (see Appendix II) as:
E(j;ijxit; Ui) = j;

T
2 + T
2

E(
 
ij xit; Ui)

= j;Ci (8,9)
E("j;itjxit; Ui) = j;"

 2 E(itj xit; Ui) 
T2
2(
2
 + T
2
)
E(
 
ij xit; Ui)

= j;"Cit
The endogeneity correction terms (Ci; Cit) dened in equations (8; 9) above,
are added as additional terms in the equation of primary interest to be estimated
jointly with (0; ) in the second step from conditional moment restrictions such as
least squares based on equation (5).7
Under the null hypothesis of no endogeneity (j; = j;" = 0), the conven-
tional standard errors can be used. Otherwise, the standard errors should be ad-
justed for heteroskedasticity and the inclusion of the endogeneity correction terms
(see Newey, 1984; Vella and Verbeek, 1999b).
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
We employ British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data and construct two
balanced panels of employees aged between 16-65 during (1991-1996, 1997-2002).
These consist of a full-time male employees sample and a full sample of female
employees (full-time and part-time). Part-time male employees are excluded since
the small gains in terms of sample size are more than outweighted by the costs of a
potential increase in the heterogeneity of the male samples. The female samples can
provide a comparison group against the male sample that could potentially su¤er
from selectivity bias. Note that the former is also prone to sample selection bias
caused by the labour market participation decision (see Swa¢ eld, 2001, p.439).
We opted to split the panels into two distinct time periods in order to compare
the end of the Conservative´s two decades of anti-union legislation and see whether
anything actually changed under New Labour that came into o¢ ce in 1997.
Descriptive statistics for the set of variables and the endogeneity correction
terms are given in Tables (1, 7-10) respectively (see Appendix IV).
7The estimation procedure of the endogeneity correction terms is provided in Appendix III.
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The unconditional male union wage di¤erential is approximately 4.5% and 4%
in the (1991-1996) and (1997-2002) samples, respectively, while, the corresponding
unconditional female union wage di¤erentials are approximately 14% and 11.9%.
Further, the descriptive statistics Tables reveal that females earn approximately
20.6% less than their male counterparts during (1991-1996) while, they earn ap-
proximately 14.4% less during (1997-2002).
Male union membership during (1997-2002) has fallen by approximately 15.3%
compared to the (1991-1996) male membership level. The female union membership
rate on the other hand, has actually risen by approximately 9.5% so that by the last
cross-section of the survey female rates converged to the level of male membership
rates at a marginally higher percentage.
Note that, an individual is taken to be a trade union member if he/she has re-
sponded positively to the question "Are you currently a member of: Trade Unions"
in the Social and Interest Group Membership section of the BHPS. Unfortunately,
this question was only asked every other year after the fth wave (1995-96) of the
survey since the data depositors believe that there is not a lot of movement in and
out of organisations and therefore, it was not felt necessary to ask this every year.
A further union membership variable which is available in the BHPS, "Member of
workplace union", can be used as a proxy for waves six (1996-97), eight (1998-99),
ten (2000-01) and twelve (2002-03). This includes "in-house" sta¤ associations, but
excludes employersorganisations.
This introduces a degree of discontinuity in our measure of trade union member-
ship, but, nevertheless when one wishes to undertake a longitudinal analysis using
BHPS data this is the only alternative available.
Prior to embarking on the analysis of the estimated results some important
issues need to be addressed. Regarding the issue of identication, the non-linear
mapping from the reduced form union membership variables to the endogeneity
correction terms identies all parameters in the wage equation (5).
The exclusion of lagged union membership status from the empirical counterpart
of (eq:5) identies the equation as long as 1 di¤ers from zero. Note that it is
assumed that the long-term advantages of union employment, whilst generating
persistence of union membership status, do not have a signicant impact on wages.
It can be argued that, while the lagged value of union membership status a¤ects
an individualsunionisation decision it does not have any signicant e¤ect on the
current wage. This occurs in that union membership status may capture movement
costs that are not specic to union employment. Workers are therefore assumed
to change union membership status only if they change jobs. Furthermore, the
long-term advantages of union employment, whilst generating persistence of union
membership status are not expected to have a signicant impact on wages and
therefore lagged union membership status is expected to have a minor e¤ect on
current wages (see Vella and Verbeek, 1998, p.167).
Note that we exclude wages from the set of explanatory variables in the union
membership models. Wages can be viewed as a collective good by the individual
therefore casting doubts on whether they can be considered as a determinant of
his/her unionisation probability (see Booth, 1986). This occurs in that, individuals
can always free ride on union bargained wages that apply to all employees within
a covered establishment irrespective of their union membership status.
Wages can be included in the union membership models to detect whether in-
dividuals do free-ride and an insignicant coe¢ cient can then validate the public
goods theory of union wages given that earnings are not proxying any omitted
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variables. Nevertheless, even if wages and union status are not determined simul-
taneously wages might be acting as a proxy for omitted variables that are simul-
taneous such as job security and pension provisions and this would produce biased
results. Since wages can be either a complement or a substitute of union negoti-
ated non-pecuniary benets the direction of the bias cannot be determined a priori,
thus rendering the interpretation of the resulting coe¢ cients on wages problematic
(Booth, 1986, p.43).
Due to the statistical signicance of the endogeneity correction terms (refer to
Tables 3-6) the standard errors in the wage models should be adjusted for het-
eroskedasticity and the inclusion of the correction terms. We use nonparametric
(pairs) Bootstrap by resampling observations with replacement to estimate the stan-
dard errors of the parameters in the reduced form models. Concerning the wage
models we use wild Bootstrap for inference robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown
form since it provides renements for the linear regression model in the presence of
heteroskedasticity (see Flachaire, 2005).8 ;9
Higher-order terms of the latent e¤ects, squared correction terms and their
interactions with union status, were included in the models in order to detect non-
normality (see Pagan and Vella, 1989) and these are reported when normality is an
issue.
Lastly but not least, it should be noted that all estimated models reported in
Tables (2-6) exclude occupational controls. Occupational status, being a measure
of ability, could be potentially endogenous and can contaminate the conclusions
concerning the role of unobserved individual heterogeneity (see Vella and Verbeek,
1998, pp.168-169).
Including occupational controls reduced the coe¢ cients on the xed individual
e¤ects in most estimated models suggesting that a component of unobserved het-
erogeneity underlying union status is correlated with occupational classication.
Further, the inclusion of occupational controls was found to inate the union wage
di¤erentials. We therefore opted to exclude occupational controls from the set of
regressors.10
4.1. The Persistence of Trade Union Membership
The reduced form estimates presented in (Table 2) suggest that union member-
ship remains persistent even after controlling for the unobserved e¤ect.11 ;12
8 In both estimating equations we use between 210-250 Bootstrap replications and these are
generally adequate for standard error estimation (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).
9We use the Rademacher distribution in the wild Bootstrap DGP. Davidson and Flachaire
(2001) demonstrate that it always produces better results than Mammen´s (1993) distribution.
Both methodologies gave similar results. In the case of the (1991-1996) female estimates we use
Mammen´s DGP as the Rademacher distribution gave inconclusive results in the case of the
unrestricted estimates.
10While the reduced form models contain interactions between University and Vocational Quali-
cations and the Public Administration and Education industrial classication these were excluded
from the primary wage equations as in many cases they exacerbated non-normality.
11With the exception of the second period female estimates whereby, lagged membership status
is only signicant at the not so stringent 10% signicance level.
12The presence of xi in expression (AI3) implies that we are not able to identify the coe¢ cients
on time-constant explanatory variables in xit. Including time-constant explanatory variables in
xit only increases the explanatory power as it is not possible to separately identify the partial
e¤ect of time-constant variables from their partial correlation with the unobserved e¤ect (see
Wooldridge, 2005, p.44).
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Exogeneity of the initial conditions is rejected since there is a considerable cor-
relation between the unobserved individual heterogeneity and the initial condition.
This occurs in that, the coe¢ cients on the initial value of union membership appear
in all estimated models with particularly strong and statistically signicant e¤ects
that are greater in magnitude as opposed to the coe¢ cients on the lagged value of
membership status.
According to the predicted probability ratios (see Table 2) a male worker with
a given set of observable and unobservable attributes is (2:9; 1:6) times as likely to
remain a union member during (1991-1996, 1997-2002) respectively. Similarly, a
female worker is approximately (1:8; 1:2) times as likely to remain a union member
in the current year if she had been so in the previous year.13
While the fall in persistence in the male samples was around 45.2% the corre-
sponding female decline was approximately 32%. This occurs in that though the
male union membership rate declined throughout the period concerned (refer to
Table 1) the respective female rate, followed an increasing path.
Conclusively then, the extent of state dependence in union membership status
declined signicantly during the period under analysis. This is in line with our
expectations following the introduction of a series of anti-union legislation (1980,
1982, 1988, 1990 Employment Acts) and its resulting impact.
Furthermore, the role of habit persistence (i.e. the behavioural e¤ect of remain-
ing in unions due to experiencing unionisation in the past) diminished relative to
the impact of unobserved heterogeneity since the proportion of the total error vari-
ation attributed to unobserved individual heterogeneity, , is markedly higher in
the second period estimates (see Table 2).
4.2. The Wage Regressions Under Hierarchical Sorting
To determine the economic sorting structure consistent with the data we begin
with the hierarchical sorting estimates that restrict the endogeneity correction terms
to be invariant to sector.
In all estimated models under hierarchical sorting the selection terms (individual-
specic and time-variant e¤ects) were found to be jointly statistically signicant and
this is suggestive of selectivity bias. Therefore, union membership and wages are
determined simultaneously and ignoring this gives biased estimates of the union
wage e¤ect.
With regard to the (1991-1996) male estimates under hierarchical sorting, the
negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the individual-specic correction
term suggests that employees who receive lower wages, upon conditioning on their
attributes and in the absence of trade unions, are those more likely to be union
members (refer to Table 3). Concerning the female estimates, the statistically
signicant and negative coe¢ cients on both correction terms in (1997-2002) and the
time-variant correction term in the (1991-1996) estimates (Tables 5, 6, respectively)
are also indicating that lower paid individuals have a higher propensity towards
union membership ceteris paribus.
However, concerning the (1997-2002) male estimates (Table 4) the positive and
statistically signicant coe¢ cients on both correction terms, imply that male em-
ployees who receive higher wages, controlling for their characteristics and in the
13Note that the degree of state dependence in male union membership appears to be more
pronounced regarding both periods under analysis. This is not surprising given that the male
samples employed solely consist of full-time employees.
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absence of unions, are those more likely to be trade union members.
The statistically signicant coe¢ cients on the time-variant individual e¤ects
in the female estimates for both periods (Tables 5, 6) and the (1997-2002) male
estimates (Table 4) indicate that, xed e¤ects estimation is inappropriate as the
time varying endogeneity is not eliminated and continues to contaminate the re-
sulting estimates. Note that even in the case whereby unobserved heterogeneity is
individual-specic and time-invariant the xed e¤ects estimator imposes the invari-
ance of heterogeneity rewards to sector and therefore, it is fairly restrictive in its
treatment of unobserved heterogeneity (see Vella and Verbeek, 1998).
In all reported models the estimated union e¤ect under xed e¤ects assumptions
is notably low. With the exception of the second period male estimates, whereby
under hierarchical sorting we get a statistically insignicant wage di¤erential, xed
e¤ects estimates provide the lower bound of the union wage e¤ect as opposed to
the uncorrected OLS and the endogeneity corrected estimates. This is consistent
with the general consensus in the union literature that the longitudinal di¤erencing
estimates of the union wage e¤ect produce a downward adjustment (e.g. Freeman,
1984; Robinson, 1989a; Jakubson, 1991).
The outcome that higher paid employees are less likely to seek union member-
ship (apart from the second period male estimates) is in line with insider-outsider
theories (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986) suggesting that groups of highly skilled em-
ployees can be seen as acting as a de facto union on its own since they cannot
be rapidly and costlessly replaced (see Blanchower el al, 1990). It is also consis-
tent with the argument that the standardisation of wage rates, via the bargaining
process, implies that workers with high degrees of human capital would be less
prone to union membership as it would entail reduced human capital premia (see
Abowd and Farber, 1982).
The nding concerning the (1997-2002) male estimates could be attributed to
highly skilled male employees within the heavily unionised public sector which are
more likely to be union members (see Chrysanthou, 2008; Blanchower and Bryson,
2010).
However, the presence of the higher-order endogeneity correction terms due
to non-normality has the implication that unobserved heterogeneity impacts nega-
tively on the wages of union members. The dominant e¤ect stems from the negative
coe¢ cient on the higher-order time-invariant correction term indicating diminish-
ing returns to unobserved heterogeneity. It is plausible that the standardisation
of wages in the union sector results in reduced human capital premia for the best
employees in terms of their endowment of unobserved productivity (see Abowd and
Farber, 1982).
The reduced form estimates (Table 2) reveal that during (1997-2002) the role
of habit persistence diminished relative to the impact of unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, regarding the male estimates it seems plausible that the higher propor-
tion of highly skilled employees remaining in unions during the second period do so
due to unobserved determinants such us solidarity, age of establishment and several
other factors that we fail to account for as opposed to maximising their earnings.
While on the basis of individual behaviour it seems reasonable to argue that
less productive employees might be more prone towards union membership in order
to appropriate some share of monopoly rents, it appears improbable that prot
maximising employers would hire them (see Abowd and Farber, 1982; Vella and
Verbeek, 1998, p.173). Since in modelling wage determination and the union mem-
bership decision we do not explicitly incorporate the employersrole, at a minimum
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we ought to investigate the impact on the estimates upon the relaxation of the as-
sumption that unobserved heterogeneity is equally valued in each sector.
4.3. The Wage Regressions Under Unrestricted Sorting
To test whether the random components are di¤erentially rewarded in the two
sectors we modify the models by allowing the endogeneity correction terms to vary
by sector.
To investigate how unobserved individual heterogeneity is rewarded in each
sector more rigorously we need to examine the average wage contribution of the
endogeneity correction terms.
The male unrestricted sorting estimates during (1991-1996: Table 3) are consis-
tent with a comparative advantage sorting specication. The negative coe¢ cient
on the individual-specic e¤ect indicates that employees that are the recipients
of lower wages, upon conditioning on their attributes and in the absence of trade
unions, are more likely to be union members. The positive coe¢ cient on the inter-
action between the xed e¤ect and union membership, however, implies that such
individuals perform relatively better in the union sector. In other words, employ-
ees perform di¤erently within the two sectors and sort themselves appropriately so
that the average contribution of unobserved heterogeneity to the wages of union
and non-union members is positive (see Table 7). Therefore, those with a relatively
higher propensity towards union membership benet most from sorting themselves
into the union sector.
Regarding the (1997-2002) male estimates (see Table 4) all endogeneity correc-
tion terms are statistically insignicant. Thus, we reject the unrestricted sorting
structure estimates in favour of the hierarchical sorting estimates.
Finally, considering the female estimates for both periods (Tables 5,6) given the
statistical insignicance of the xed individual e¤ect the dominant e¤ect determin-
ing the sorting structure consistent with the estimates stems from the time-variant
e¤ects. The average contribution of the time-variant e¤ects to the wages of union
members is negative whereas the corresponding contribution to the wages of non-
union members is positive. Therefore unobserved heterogeneity impacts negatively
on the wages of union members, irrespective of the sector they sort themselves into.
Hence, we cannot reject the hierarchical sorting specication.
While the restriction that the random components are equally rewarded in the
two sectors is only rejected in the (1991-1996) male estimates we do not believe that
estimation of the remaining models by Instrumental Variables or restricted Control
Function estimators is appropriate. Primarily since the structure of sorting into
the union and non-union sectors cannot be known a priori we see no reason why
one should preclude a comparative advantage sorting structure by employing these
estimators.
Further, one should bear in mind that solely a degenerate hierarchical struc-
ture, imposing perfect correlation between sector-specic skills, can meet the strict
and restrictive requirement imposed by Instrumental Variables and variants of the
restricted Control Function estimators (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999a).
4.4. The Estimated Union Wage E¤ects
According to the economic sorting structure supported by the estimates UK
trade unions were unable to establish a union wage e¤ect for their male members.
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However, regarding the female portion of the labour market the union wage
e¤ect is estimated to be approximately (19.4% , 17.6%) during (1991-1996, 1997-
2002) respectively (refer to Tables 5, 6). The signicant contribution of unobserved
individual heterogeneity renders the total union wage di¤erential highly variable
across individuals.
Note that, it is likely that the paucity of employer controls might be biasing
upwards the union wage impact since unionised establishments tend to pay more
for reasons not directly linked to union membership (see Blanchower and Bryson,
2010).
The outcome that unions were unable to establish a union wage di¤erential
for their male members is not surprising given the successive legislative changes
targeted towards weakening the bargaining strength of UK trade unions (for a
detailed account refer to Stewart, 1995). The overall e¤ect of the (1980, 1982, 1988
and 1990) Employment Acts was that the ensuing period was an era of a dramatic
decline in aggregate trade union membership and union recognition in the UK.
Nevertheless, the estimated female union wage di¤erentials imply that unions
still play a non-negligible role in wage formation even though we observe a decline
of approximately 9.3% in the female union wage e¤ect during the second period
under analysis.
The outcome that female employees still receive substantial union wage di¤er-
entials is consistent with the expectation that unions raise the wages of those who
would have been relatively lower paid in their absence. In fact, the descriptive sta-
tistics (in Table 1) reveal that females earn approximately 20.6% and 14.4% less
than their male counterparts during (1991-1996, 1997-2002), respectively.
Further, provided that unionism is assumed to be a normal good an employees
demand for unionism is positively related to his/her union wage di¤erential (see
Chang and Lai, 1997, p.121). Therefore lower paid employees, in the absence
of unions, for discriminatory reasons are more likely to be prone towards union
membership (see for instance Heywood, 1990). This is in line with the fact that, in
the period under analysis, while male union membership has been declining female
union membership has been rising (refer to Table 1).
The estimated union wage e¤ects are comparable to the recent estimates of
Blanchower and Bryson (2010) using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS).
We opted to compare the results of this study to the estimates of Blanchower and
Bryson (2010) in that, they use a similar time period and UK data while they do
not account for the endogeneity of union status.
The corresponding uncorrected OLS union wage di¤erentials of Blanchower
and Bryson (2010), using personal and industrial controls, are approximately (6.5%,
4%) for males and (19.1%, 13.8%) for females during (1993-1999) and (2000-2006),
respectively (see Blanchower and Bryson, 2010, p.101).
One could argue that the evident continuous decline in UK union wage di¤er-
entials explains the relatively higher endogeneity corected estimates of the female
union wage e¤ects (19.4%: 1991-1996, 17.6%: 1997-2002) from the present study
that uses data from an earlier period. Therefore, we should not be particularly
preoccupied with the endogeneity of union membership status.
However, while in the case of the female union wage e¤ects the results from
this study are comparable to the estimates of Blanchower and Bryson (2010) the
discrepancy in the male union wage impact highlights the necessity to control for
the endogeneity of union membership status.
OLS di¤erentials denote the di¤erence between the average wage of those that
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are actually in the union sector and the average of those employees that are lo-
cated in the non-union sector ceteris paribus. Endogeneity corrected di¤erentials
on the other hand come from a random assignment to sector (see Robinson, 1989a,
p.660).14
According to the orthodox view prot maximising establishments within the
unionised sector will select the best employees thus inating the OLS estimate
of the union wage di¤erential (e.g. Abowd and Farber, 1982; Freeman, 1984).
However, this will only result in an upward bias for OLS under a hierarchical
sorting structure of omitted ability when the average contribution of unobserved
individual heterogeneity to the wages of union members is positive as is the case
with the (1997-2002) male estimates in this study.
Under hierarchical sorting, the average contribution of unobserved heterogeneity
to the wages of male union members during (1991-1996) and female members during
both periods is negative so that they receive lower wages irrespective of the sector
they are located in. Therefore, this reverses the direction of the OLS bias from
positive to negative.
Recall that, the union wage impact under xed e¤ects provides the lower bound
among the statistically signicant estimated union wage e¤ects. Conclusively then,
the endogeneity correction procedure employed yields a discernible pattern of es-
timates of the union wage di¤erential relative to OLS and xed e¤ects. Hence, it
does contribute to our understanding of the union wage e¤ect puzzle. This conicts
with Freeman and Medo¤ (1982) and Lewis (1986) and is in line with Robinson
(1989a).
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Using data from the BHPS (1991-2003) we employ a dynamic model of union
membership status and wage determination to estimate the wage impact of UK
trade unions. The ndings reveal that the unobserved factors that inuence union
membership also a¤ect the wage impact of unions. Therefore, we cannot fail to
account for the endogeneity of union membership status.
Though trade union membership remains persistent even after controlling for the
unobserved e¤ect, we observe a signicant decline in union membership persistence
during the period under analysis.
While UK trade unions were unable to establish a union wage e¤ect for their
male members, the female union wage di¤erential is estimated to be approximately
(19.4% , 17.6%) during (1991-1996, 1997-2002) respectively. The signicant con-
tribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity renders the total union wage dif-
ferential highly variable across individuals.
The outcome that unions were unable to establish a union wage di¤erential for
their male members is in agreement with our expectations following the successive
(1980, 1982, 1988 and 1990) Employment Acts targeted towards weakening the
bargaining strength of UK trade unions.
However, the estimated female union wage di¤erentials imply that unions still
play a non-negligible role in wage formation though we observe a decline of approx-
imately 9.3% in the estimated wage e¤ect during the second period under analysis.
The result that female employees still receive substantial union wage di¤erentials
14Note that there are no individuals who are randomly assigned. Random assignment refers to
controlling for the unobservables underlying the unionisation decision which are correlated with
the wage rate (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999a, p.474).
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is consistent with the expectation that unions raise the wages of those who would
have been relatively lower paid in their absence.
While our estimated female wage di¤erentials are comparable to the recent
uncorrected estimates of Blanchower and Bryson (2010), the results concerning
the male union wage e¤ects highlight the necessity to account for the endogeneity
of union membership.
Employees receiving lower wages, upon conditioning on their attributes and in
the absence of trade unions, are those more likely to be union members (excluding
the 1997-2002 male estimates). This is in accordance with insider-outsider theories
(Lindbeck and Snower, 1986) indicating that groups of highly qualied employees
do not need to rely on unions to gain higher wages since they can be valuable assets
to employers (see Blanchower el al, 1990). It is also consistent with the argument
that the standardisation of wage rates through the bargaining process suggests that
those with higher levels of human capital would be less likely to join unions as it
would entail reduced human capital premia (Abowd and Farber, 1982).
The models for union status determination show that the role of habit per-
sistence diminished relative to the impact of unobserved heterogeneity during the
period under analysis. Therefore, regarding the male estimates it seems plausible
that the higher proportion of highly skilled employees remaining in the union sector
in the second period, do so due to unobserved determinants such us solidarity, age
of establishment and several other factors that we fail to account for as opposed to
maximising their earnings.
We conclude that the endogeneity correction procedure employed yields a dis-
cernible pattern relative to OLS and xed e¤ects and therefore contributes to our
understanding of the union wage di¤erential puzzle. This refutes the pessimistic
conclusions reached by Freeman and Medo¤ (1982) and Lewis (1986) and is in
agreement with Robinson (1989a).
The obvious future research direction is to use the new cross sections of the
BHPS in order to estimate the union wage impact during (2003-2009). Further,
given the outcome regarding the second period male estimates it could be worth
exploring the wage impact of UK trade unions in the public and private sectors
using matched employer-employee data.
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6. APPENDIX I: HANDLING THE INITIAL CONDITIONS PROBLEM
Union membership decision is modelled using the dynamic Random e¤ects Pro-
bit specication given in equation (AI1):
Uit = 
0
1xit + 2Ui;t 1 + #i + it; it  N(0; 2) (AI1)
Adopting the Mundlak (1978)-Chamberlain (1984) specication we can allow
for a correlation between #i and the time means of the observed time-varying
characteristics taking the form of #i = x0i{ + i. Substituting this expression
for #i in equation (AI1) we arrive at specication (AI2) where it is assumed that
i  iidN(0; 2) and is independent of (xit; it) for all i and t:
Uit = 
0
1xit + 2Ui;t 1 + x
0
i{ + i + it; it  N(0; 2) (AI2)
We employ Wooldridges (2005) solution to the initial conditions problem. This
species a distribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity conditional on the
initial condition instead of obtaining the joint distribution of all outcomes of the
endogenous variables.
We begin by specifying the distribution of the unobserved e¤ect as:
#ijUi1; xi  N(0 + 1Ui1 + x0i2; 2); xi = fxi1; :::; xiT g (AI3)
where the (1xT ) row vector xi contains all non-redundant explanatory variables in
all periods under consideration.
The density D(Ui1; :::; UiT jUi1 = U1; xi = x; i = ) is given by:
T

t=1
f(01xt+2Ut 1+0+1Ui1+x02+)yt :[1 (01xt+2Ut 1+0+1Ui1+x02+)]1 ytg
(AI4)
To nd the joint distribution of (Ui2; :::; UiT jUi1 = U1; xi = x) we need to
integrate out i. Integrating (AI4) against the Normal (0; 2) gives the likelihood
function in expression (AI5) which is identical to the structure of the standard
Random e¤ects Probit model with the only di¤erence that the explanatory variables
at time t are fzit  (1; xit; Ui;t 1; Ui1; xi)g:
Z
R
T

t=1
f(01xt + 2Ut 1 + 0 + 1Ui1 + x02 + )yt : (AI5)
[1  (01xt + 2Ut 1 + 0 + 1Ui1 + x02 + )]1 ytg(1=)(=)d
To obtain the magnitudes of state dependence the average partial, marginal,
e¤ects (
^
pj   ^p0) and predicted probability ratios (
^
pj=
^
p0) were estimated using the
following counter-factual probabilities that take Ut 1 to be xed at 0 and 1 and are
evaluated at xit = x (see Stewart, 2007):
^
pj =
1
N
NX
i=1
{(
^

0
1x+
^
2+
^
1Ui1+x0i
^
2)
q
1  f}; ^p0=
1
N
NX
i=1
{(
^

0
1x+
^
1Ui1+x0i
^
2)
q
1  f}
 = cor(vit; vis) =
2i
2i + 1
; t; s = 2; :::; T ; t 6= s (AI6)
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7. APPENDIX II: DERIVATION OF THE ENDOGENEITY CORRECTION
TERMS
Following Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999b) we use the assumption of joint nor-
mality to derive the expectation of ej;it in (eq:5) conditional on the vector i and
the vector of exogenous variables xit. Employing the standard formulae for the
conditional expectation of normally distributed vectors:
E(j;ijxit; i) = j;

T
2 + T
2

 
i

(AII1)
E("j;itjxit; i) = j;"

 2 it  
T2
2(
2
 + T
2
)
 
i

(AII2)
To obtain the conditional expectations, given the t-dimensional vector Ui, we
replace i in (eq:AII1,AII2) by their conditional expectations given Ui. Using the
rst law of iterated expectations:
E(itjxit; Ui) = E(#i + itjxit; Ui) = E#i [#i + Efitjxit; Ui; #ig] (AII3)
=
Z 1
 1
[#i + E(itjxit; Ui; #i)]f(#ijxit; Ui)d#i
where f(#ijxit; Ui) is the conditional density of #i.
Given the assumption of the strict exogeneity of xit the conditional distribution
of #i is:
f(#ijxit; Ui) = f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i)
f(Uijxit) (AII4)
Substituting expression AII4 into AII3 we arrive at:
E(itjxit; Ui) = 1
f(Uijxit)
Z 1
 1
[#i + E(itjxit; Ui; #i)]f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i)d#i = (AII5)
=
1Z
f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i; xit)d#i
Z 1
 1
[#i + E(itjxit; Ui; #i)]f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i)d#i
where we have used f(Uijxit) =
R
f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i; xit)d#i and Efitjxit; Ui; #ig
denotes the cross-sectional generalised Probit residual (see Gourieroux et al, 1987)
obtained from the rst step estimates of the reduced form model:
E(itjxit; Ui; #i) = (2Ui   1)

f(2Ui   1)(0	it + i)=g
f(2Ui   1)(0	it + i)=g

(AII6)
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8. APPENDIX III: ESTIMATION OF THE ENDOGENEITY CORRECTION
TERMS
The term in the denominator in expression AII5 is the likelihood contribution
for individual i. Given the parameter estimates from the reduced form model
1 = (1; 2; #i) we can approximate expression AII5 using quadrature methods
or simulation (numerical integration).
To estimate the simulated counterpart of AII5 we obtain R draws of #
r
i from
f(#ij#i) = N(0; #i) and compute the corresponding log-likelihood for individual
i conditional on the draw:
f(Uijxit; #ri ) =
TY
t=1
f(Uitjxit; #ri ) (AIII1)
To provide a better coverage of the integrals we use randomised Halton draws
since the asymptotic properties of simulation-based estimators are obtained under
the assumption of randomness.15 Supplementing these with antithetic draws we
induce a negative correlation over observations thus, further improving the coverage
(see Train, 2003; Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006). The procedure is repeated R
times and averaging over these replications we obtain the simulated log-likelihood
function:
f(Uijxit; #ri ) = ln
1
R
RX
r
f(Uijxi; #ri ) (AIII2)
Estimators obtained by maximising likelihoods that are approximated by sim-
ulation techniques are known as MSL estimators and have the same large-sample
properties as maximum likelihood, if the number of repetitions used to approximate
the integral grows at a higher rate than the square root of the number of obser-
vations in the sample (see Drukker, 2006, p.153). We use 500 randomised Halton
draws and 500 antithetic draws, R = 1000, and given the sample sizes
p
N=R  ! 0.
Given the estimates from the reduced form model we can simulate the expression
for E(itjxit; Ui).
Taking again R draws from f(#ij#i) expression AII5 is approximated by:

it =
1
R
1
R
X
r
f(Uijxit; #ri )
1
R
RX
r
[#ri + E(itjxit; Ui; #ri )]f(Uijxit; #ri ) (AIII3)
The individual specic means E(
 
ij xit; Ui) can be computed using:   i =
1
Ti
PTi
t=1

it . Substituting the estimates for E(itjxit; Ui) and E( ij xit; Ui) into
(eq:8; 9) we obtain the endogeneity correction terms (Ci; Cit).
15Randomised Halton draws have identical properties of coverage over observations as Hatlon
draws, however, they are not systematic at least in the same manner pseudorandom numbers are
random (see Train, 2003, pp.234-235).
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9. APPENDIX IV: TABLES
                                                                                               TABLE 1
               Descriptive Statistics
1991-1996 1997-2002
Gender Male Female Male Female
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Log of Hourly Wage 2.073 0.464 1.746 0.472 2.264 0.466 1.995 0.461
Trade Union Membership 0.4099 0.492 0.3173 0.465 0.3471 0.476 0.3474 0.476
Log (1+Potential Experience) 3.223 0.634 3.166 0.715 3.558 0.456 3.544 0.467
Marital Status 0.692 0.462 0.683 0.465 0.665 0.472 0.642 0.479
Full-Time Employment _ _ 0.672 0.469 _ _ 0.709 0.454
Maternity Leave _ _ 0.011 0.104 _ _ 0.013 0.113
Black (Caribbean, African, Other) 0.001 0.035 0.005 0.068 0.002 0.047 0.006 0.079
Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.014 0.116 0.008 0.090 0.013 0.113 0.013 0.111
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.009 0.093 0.005 0.068 0.007 0.080 0.005 0.072
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.300 0.458 0.300 0.458 0.269 0.444 0.282 0.450
South West 0.097 0.296 0.070 0.255 0.094 0.291 0.095 0.293
Midlands 0.167 0.373 0.158 0.365 0.192 0.394 0.172 0.377
Scotland 0.078 0.269 0.097 0.296 0.078 0.268 0.089 0.285
Wales 0.053 0.224 0.047 0.211 0.056 0.230 0.050 0.219
North West 0.110 0.313 0.112 0.316 0.102 0.303 0.111 0.315
North East 0.150 0.358 0.175 0.380 0.170 0.376 0.160 0.366
East Anglia 0.044 0.205 0.041 0.198 0.040 0.195 0.041 0.198
University Degree or Higher 0.158 0.365 0.109 0.312 0.169 0.375 0.133 0.340
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.082 0.274 0.074 0.263 0.087 0.281 0.078 0.268
A Levels 0.239 0.426 0.155 0.362 0.267 0.442 0.225 0.418
O Levels or CSE 0.333 0.471 0.426 0.495 0.345 0.475 0.409 0.492
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.157 0.364 0.199 0.399 0.181 0.385 0.206 0.404
Workforce >500 0.213 0.410 0.156 0.363 0.206 0.405 0.173 0.379
Workforce 100-499 0.303 0.460 0.228 0.419 0.297 0.457 0.213 0.409
Workforce 25-99 0.271 0.445 0.275 0.447 0.248 0.432 0.271 0.445
Workforce <25 0.213 0.409 0.340 0.474 0.249 0.432 0.343 0.475
 Industrial Classification Dummies
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 0.016 0.125 0.006 0.080 0.006 0.078 0.005 0.067
Energy and Water Supplies 0.051 0.220 0.007 0.085 0.025 0.155 0.007 0.083
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals 0.052 0.221 0.018 0.134 0.053 0.225 0.014 0.116
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries 0.156 0.363 0.050 0.219 0.138 0.345 0.030 0.171
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.122 0.328 0.067 0.250 0.151 0.359 0.062 0.241
Construction 0.044 0.204 0.006 0.076 0.055 0.227 0.006 0.079
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) 0.116 0.320 0.177 0.382 0.122 0.327 0.185 0.388
Transport & Communication 0.091 0.288 0.030 0.171 0.105 0.307 0.036 0.187
Banking & Finance 0.134 0.341 0.153 0.360 0.143 0.350 0.154 0.361
Public Administration, Education, Other 0.219 0.414 0.484 0.500 0.202 0.401 0.502 0.500
Occupational Classification Dummies
Professional Occupations 0.124 0.330 0.107 0.310 0.098 0.297 0.106 0.308
Managers & Administrators 0.180 0.384 0.097 0.296 0.196 0.397 0.120 0.325
Associate Professional & Technical 0.108 0.311 0.124 0.329 0.110 0.312 0.141 0.349
Clerical & Secretarial 0.099 0.298 0.333 0.471 0.081 0.273 0.302 0.459
Craft & related 0.182 0.386 0.026 0.161 0.202 0.401 0.021 0.143
Personal & Protective Service 0.069 0.253 0.117 0.322 0.059 0.235 0.131 0.338
Sales 0.033 0.179 0.076 0.266 0.035 0.183 0.090 0.287
Plant & Machine Operatives 0.152 0.359 0.037 0.188 0.158 0.365 0.030 0.170
Other Occupations 0.054 0.227 0.081 0.273 0.063 0.243 0.059 0.235
Number of Observations 4818 5172 5538 5760
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
20
                     TABLE 2
                                 Dynamic Random  Effects Probit Models of Union Membership
                         Male 1991-1996                     Male 1997-2002                           Female 1991-1996                         Female 1997-2002
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Lagged Trade Union Membership 1.386 8.21 0.568 2.60 0.940 6.24 0.298 1.78
Trade Union Membership (1) 1.877 5.83 3.676 3.62 1.932 6.03 3.234 5.97
Log(1+Potential Experience) 0.027 0.32 0.045 0.20 0.098 1.22 0.024 0.10
Marital Status -0.026 -0.09 0.261 0.61 -0.168 -0.77 0.268 0.74
Mean(Marital Status) 0.140 0.47 -0.244 -0.54 0.555 2.27 0.350 0.82
Full-Time Employment _ _ _ _ 0.109 0.58 0.038 0.17
Mean(Full-Time Employment) _ _ _ _ 0.268 1.25 0.381 1.05
Maternity Leave _ _ _ _ -0.034 -0.08 -0.147 -0.33
Mean(Maternity Leave) _ _ _ _ 1.280 1.20 1.183 0.60
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) -0.222 -0.76 1.102 1.49 0.715 1.87 -0.052 -0.08
Black(Caribbean, African, Other) -0.281 -0.04 -0.926 -0.19 -0.545 -0.84 1.694 1.33
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.191 0.29 -1.493 -1.45 -0.658 -0.34 1.425 1.24
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East -0.282 -2.26 -0.324 -1.05 -0.202 -1.27 -0.421 -1.33
South West -0.072 -0.42 0.368 0.99 -0.034 -0.18 -0.430 -1.05
Scotland -0.394 -2.22 0.152 0.42 0.320 1.53 0.385 0.94
Wales 0.340 2.01 0.741 1.70 0.333 1.47 0.690 1.64
North West 0.010 0.06 0.294 0.85 -0.153 -0.83 0.057 0.14
North East -0.196 -1.28 -0.043 -0.14 0.316 1.79 0.339 0.91
East Anglia -0.397 -1.74 0.057 0.12 0.007 0.03 -0.697 -1.40
Public, Educ, Other& University Qual/Higher 0.085 0.22 0.323 0.48 0.727 1.62 1.793 1.85
Public, Educ, Other& Vocational Qualif ications 0.287 0.91 0.462 0.70 1.285 1.70 0.135 0.18
University Degree or Higher -0.374 -1.49 -0.617 -1.49 -0.580 -1.55 -0.710 -0.79
HND, HNC, Teaching -0.049 -0.23 -0.808 -1.65 -0.650 -1.03 0.680 1.04
A Levels 0.003 0.02 0.171 0.63 0.099 0.59 0.475 1.26
O Levels or CSE 0.069 0.57 0.204 0.70 0.024 0.21 0.300 0.84
Workforce >500 0.418 2.57 0.896 3.35 0.440 2.63 0.660 2.60
Workforce 100-499 0.295 1.95 0.973 3.88 0.348 2.39 0.547 2.39
Workforce 25-99 0.151 0.91 0.543 2.47 0.152 1.16 0.188 0.90
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -0.965 -2.21 -2.554 -0.43 -8.660 -5.69 -1.170 -0.11
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals -0.235 -0.71 -1.305 -1.72 0.267 0.40 -0.734 -0.68
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.643 -2.69 -1.086 -1.53 -0.848 -1.27 -1.117 -1.06
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.102 -0.40 -1.180 -1.57 -0.287 -0.47 -0.929 -0.92
Construction -0.480 -1.50 -1.092 -1.33 0.647 0.20 -0.254 -0.10
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -1.125 -3.87 -1.504 -2.00 -0.235 -0.40 -0.919 -0.98
Transport & Communication -0.058 -0.22 -0.772 -0.97 0.082 0.12 -0.767 -0.76
Banking & Finance -0.383 -1.32 -1.126 -1.45 0.144 0.24 -0.799 -0.85
Public Administration, Education, Other 0.291 1.07 -0.272 -0.35 0.217 0.36 -0.156 -0.17
Constant -1.803 -4.17 -2.157 -1.63 -3.182 -4.37 -2.787 -2.08
ρ 0.395 8.63 0.671 8.91 0.498 10.32 0.743 18.31
Average Partial Effect 0.396 0.088 0.259 0.046
Predicted Probability Ratio 2.909 1.595 1.792 1.218
Log-Likelihood -1050.74 -1079.59 -1325.87 -1475.37
Notes
1. Standard error estimates provided above obtained using (211, 210, 242, 217) "Nonparametric Bootstrap" replications respectively
2. Time dummies included in all models
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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                TABLE 3
                                                            Wage Regressions (1991-1996), Males
OLS Fixed Effects Hierarchical Unrestricted
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. z Coef. z
Trade Union Membership 0.042 3.48 0.038 2.89 0.086 4.96 0.004 0.25
Potential Labour Market Experience 0.012 6.79 0.066 15.54 0.008 4.26 0.008 4.30
Squared Experience 0.000 -4.46 0.000 -3.95 0.000 -2.28 0.000 -2.69
Marital Status 0.175 14.40 0.005 0.27 0.155 12.02 0.160 12.38
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) -0.020 -0.44 _ _ -0.014 -0.36 0.005 0.11
Black(Carribean, African, Other) -0.187 -1.23 _ _ -0.137 -1.20 -0.158 -1.40
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.040 -0.68 _ _ 0.050 0.86 0.055 0.98
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.235 14.21 0.037 0.56 0.210 11.34 0.207 11.35
South West 0.104 4.80 0.100 1.19 0.018 0.74 0.040 1.65
Scotland -0.013 -0.55 -0.083 -0.67 -0.042 -1.63 -0.030 -1.19
Wales -0.006 -0.23 0.030 0.31 -0.045 -1.84 0.005 0.19
North West 0.081 3.87 -0.183 -2.13 0.049 2.16 0.078 3.36
North East 0.083 4.37 0.222 2.15 0.089 4.31 0.042 2.02
East Anglia 0.071 2.48 0.000 0 0.000 -0.01 0.008 0.24
University Degree or Higher 0.559 24.35 0.159 1.47 0.519 19.00 0.499 18.74
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.391 15.81 0.046 0.39 0.357 14.82 0.370 15.29
A Levels 0.273 15.04 0.203 2.42 0.260 12.13 0.261 11.36
O Levels or CSE 0.153 9.28 0.084 1.21 0.161 8.65 0.166 8.89
Workforce >500 0.178 10.26 0.031 1.84 0.181 9.67 0.148 7.90
Workforce 100-499 0.126 7.94 0.031 2.07 0.118 7.14 0.106 5.84
Workforce 25-99 0.088 5.60 0.024 1.72 0.073 4.23 0.062 3.39
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -0.472 -9.34 -0.254 -3.23 -0.460 -8.85 -0.442 -8.71
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals -0.232 -6.92 -0.075 -1.5 -0.213 -6.31 -0.203 -6.48
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.266 -9.49 -0.108 -2.4 -0.243 -8.01 -0.224 -7.66
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.279 -9.65 -0.087 -1.88 -0.241 -7.25 -0.259 -8.39
Construction -0.251 -7.07 -0.131 -2.68 -0.254 -7.09 -0.182 -5.19
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -0.372 -12.32 -0.191 -4.21 -0.329 -9.16 -0.382 -11.06
Transport & Communication -0.318 -10.58 -0.147 -2.99 -0.287 -9.35 -0.303 -9.53
Banking & Finance -0.056 -1.94 -0.155 -3.56 0.003 0.08 -0.016 -0.50
Public Administration, Education, Other -0.195 -7.30 -0.129 -2.83 -0.196 -6.76 -0.147 -5.27
Ci _ _ _ _ -0.030 -2.75 -0.044 -2.74
Cit _ _ _ _ -0.015 -1.03 -0.010 -0.56
Ci.(Union Membership) _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.056 2.54
Cit .(Union Membership) _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.076 2.64
Constant 1.403 32.50 0.425 3.94 1.539 29.52 1.564 33.28
Adj R ² 0.375 _ 0.355 0.347
Notes
1. Hierarchical/ Unrestricted Standard Errors obtained using 250 "Wild Bootstrap" replications
2. All models, except Fixed effects, are inclusive of time dummies
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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                              TABLE 4
                                                           Wage Regressions (1997-2002), Males
OLS Fixed Effects Hierarchical Unrestricted
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. z Coef. z
Trade Union Membership 0.059 5.13 0.054 3.85 0.014 0.78 0.099 5.49
Potential Labour Market Experience 0.014 6.09 0.069 11.70 0.008 3.55 0.009 3.71
Squared Experience 0.000 -7.10 0.000 -3.21 0.000 -4.78 0.000 -4.51
Marital Status 0.212 20.42 0.086 4.94 0.215 20.84 0.192 18.33
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) -0.157 -3.62 _ _ -0.185 -3.52 -0.176 -3.14
Black(Carribean, African, Other) 0.155 1.48 _ _ 0.020 0.16 0.041 0.36
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.025 -0.41 _ _ -0.128 -1.77 0.009 0.12
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.171 11.72 0.094 1.24 0.165 10.11 0.151 9.16
South West 0.128 6.69 0.081 0.67 0.121 5.27 0.147 6.67
Scotland 0.023 1.13 -0.061 -0.37 -0.006 -0.29 0.023 0.94
Wales -0.017 -0.72 0.087 0.90 -0.010 -0.50 -0.035 -1.64
North West 0.031 1.63 -0.078 -0.92 0.030 1.53 0.028 1.38
North East 0.005 0.33 0.037 0.58 0.012 0.62 -0.014 -0.75
East Anglia 0.027 1.02 0.064 0.61 0.010 0.40 0.020 0.72
University Degree or Higher 0.542 28.08 0.172 1.78 0.531 23.77 0.577 26.27
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.398 18.19 0.298 2.77 0.383 16.51 0.423 17.84
A Levels 0.230 13.79 0.086 1.00 0.222 12.65 0.253 13.75
O Levels or CSE 0.150 9.61 -0.055 -0.63 0.139 8.17 0.171 10.21
Workforce >500 0.185 12.22 0.030 1.81 0.182 10.55 0.167 9.63
Workforce 100-499 0.115 8.24 0.024 1.72 0.096 6.25 0.090 5.91
Workforce 25-99 0.040 2.90 0.007 0.53 0.010 0.64 0.020 1.40
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -0.670 -9.70 -0.109 -1.53 -0.643 -7.47 -0.756 -9.90
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals -0.115 -3.09 -0.001 -0.02 -0.124 -3.83 -0.148 -4.36
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.227 -6.73 -0.055 -1.29 -0.207 -6.62 -0.258 -8.51
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.271 -8.07 -0.004 -0.10 -0.211 -6.35 -0.281 -8.96
Construction -0.207 -5.54 -0.007 -0.16 -0.136 -3.84 -0.218 -6.10
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -0.396 -11.48 -0.085 -1.93 -0.367 -10.77 -0.410 -12.94
Transport & Communication -0.290 -8.47 0.027 0.58 -0.249 -7.59 -0.287 -9.22
Banking & Finance -0.067 -1.97 -0.071 -1.59 -0.043 -1.18 -0.092 -2.60
Public Administration, Education, Other -0.223 -6.85 -0.099 -2.24 -0.191 -6.23 -0.246 -7.75
Ci _ _ _ _ 0.040 1.90 -0.002 -0.08
Cit _ _ _ _ 0.029 2.04 -0.008 -0.46
Ci.(Union Membership) _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.057 -1.53
Cit .(Union Membership) _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.030 -1.16
C²i _ _ _ _ -0.134 -4.55 _ _
C²it _ _ _ _ 0.020 2.29 _ _
Constant 1.656 31.92 0.013 0.10 1.847 33.61 1.810 33.39
Adj R ² 0.419 _ 0.400 0.406
Notes
1. Hierarchical/ Unrestricted Standard Errors obtained using 250 "Wild Bootstrap" replications
2. All models, except Fixed effects, are inclusive of time dummies
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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                             TABLE 5
                                               Wage Regressions (1991-1996), Females
OLS Fixed Effects Hierarchical Unrestricted
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. z Coef. z
Trade Union Membership 0.128 10.54 0.013 1.02 0.177 9.22 0.174 8.39
Potential Labour Market Experience 0.005 2.96 0.067 16.28 0.000 0.21 0.004 2.41
Squared Experience 0.000 -3.86 0.000 -5.07 0.000 -1.62 0.000 -2.91
Marital Status 0.071 6.06 0.022 1.24 0.082 6.78 0.060 4.89
Full-Time Employment 0.103 8.54 -0.109 -7.51 0.096 7.13 0.099 6.72
Maternity Leave -0.340 -6.92 -0.403 -12.28 -0.377 -3.35 -0.257 -3.24
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.076 1.31 _ _ 0.093 1.95 0.166 2.90
Black(Carribean, African, Other) 0.085 1.12 _ _ 0.125 2.13 0.003 0.06
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.020 -0.26 _ _ 0.042 0.44 -0.010 -0.10
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.204 12.58 0.146 2.34 0.204 10.58 0.204 11.38
South West 0.020 0.85 0.010 0.11 0.055 2.02 0.028 1.09
Scotland 0.081 3.83 0.424 4.52 0.068 2.98 0.053 2.29
Wales 0.070 2.58 0.165 0.78 0.063 2.32 0.082 3.15
North West 0.077 3.87 0.232 1.67 0.075 3.30 0.077 4.12
North East -0.009 -0.50 0.092 0.81 -0.025 -1.28 -0.017 -0.94
East Anglia -0.021 -0.74 0.831 4.13 -0.043 -1.37 -0.035 -1.10
University Degree or Higher 0.543 24.17 0.055 0.49 0.545 24.58 0.571 25.42
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.418 17.43 -0.004 -0.05 0.403 15.62 0.441 16.42
A Levels 0.213 11.00 -0.009 -0.15 0.175 9.19 0.254 12.01
O Levels or CSE 0.128 8.76 -0.056 -1.05 0.112 8.24 0.143 10.71
Workforce >500 0.191 11.67 0.031 1.72 0.166 8.98 0.124 7.12
Workforce 100-499 0.148 10.30 0.038 2.49 0.141 8.86 0.111 7.15
Workforce 25-99 0.079 5.92 0.016 1.30 0.082 5.22 0.038 2.66
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals 0.082 1.44 0.113 1.72 0.005 0.08 -0.111 -1.85
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.017 -0.34 0.081 1.55 -0.085 -1.40 -0.183 -3.50
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.111 -2.39 0.016 0.31 -0.172 -2.67 -0.291 -5.42
Construction 0.054 0.68 0.081 1.12 -0.072 -1.01 -0.157 -2.01
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -0.199 -4.54 0.029 0.62 -0.292 -4.67 -0.402 -7.91
Transport & Communication -0.013 -0.26 0.021 0.35 -0.112 -1.57 -0.254 -4.22
Banking & Finance 0.107 2.42 0.048 0.98 -0.004 -0.07 -0.117 -2.30
Public Administration, Education, Other 0.029 0.69 0.048 1.03 -0.082 -1.36 -0.188 -3.80
Ci _ _ _ _ 0.002 0.16 0.025 1.19
Cit _ _ _ _ -0.110 -8.40 -0.081 -4.32
Ci.(Union Membership) _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.080 -2.27
Cit .(Union Membership) _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.026 0.84
Constant 1.108 21.47 0.080 0.80 1.367 19.31 1.423 24.42
Adj R ² 0.403 _ 0.407 0.408
Notes
1. Hierarchical/ Unrestricted Standard Errors obtained using 250 "Wild Bootstrap" replications
2. All models, except Fixed effects, are inclusive of time dummies
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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              TABLE  6
                                             Wage Regressions (1997-2002), Females
OLS Fixed Effects Hierarchical Unrestricted
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. z Coef. z
Trade Union Membership 0.115 10.49 0.048 3.81 0.162 9.25 0.149 8.25
Potential Labour Market Experience -0.003 -1.54 0.065 10.44 -0.003 -1.18 -0.004 -1.59
Squared Experience 0.000 -0.12 0.000 -2.15 0.000 -0.43 0.000 -0.23
Marital Status 0.046 4.46 0.069 3.67 0.027 2.22 0.034 2.89
Full-Time Employment 0.067 6.00 -0.065 -4.64 0.071 5.58 0.056 4.71
Maternity Leave -0.236 -5.59 -0.239 -7.66 -0.239 -3.27 -0.232 -3.36
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) -0.169 -3.91 _ _ -0.238 -4.87 -0.170 -3.27
Black(Carribean, African, Other) -0.077 -1.26 _ _ -0.089 -3.19 -0.092 -2.87
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.081 -1.22 _ _ -0.026 -0.33 0.018 0.21
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.189 12.89 0.038 0.53 0.197 11.91 0.209 13.56
South West 0.062 3.21 0.037 0.36 0.062 2.97 0.077 4.22
Scotland 0.089 4.49 0.317 1.94 0.078 3.45 0.118 5.23
Wales 0.060 2.48 0.130 0.87 0.080 2.80 0.109 4.07
North West 0.049 2.66 0.080 0.53 0.043 2.07 0.035 1.75
North East 0.019 1.15 0.006 0.07 0.038 2.03 0.012 0.69
East Anglia -0.020 -0.75 -0.029 -0.18 -0.020 -0.76 -0.047 -1.83
University Degree or Higher 0.500 25.16 0.411 3.22 0.534 25.62 0.498 25.01
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.343 15.71 0.335 2.41 0.343 13.90 0.365 14.62
A Levels 0.180 10.88 0.163 1.34 0.194 10.20 0.215 11.92
O Levels or CSE 0.147 10.01 0.100 0.93 0.148 9.92 0.151 9.77
Workforce >500 0.181 12.42 0.050 2.62 0.193 12.27 0.174 10.95
Workforce 100-499 0.156 11.61 0.051 3.24 0.166 11.62 0.179 11.70
Workforce 25-99 0.092 7.43 0.032 2.39 0.097 7.18 0.087 6.21
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -0.205 -2.25 0.011 0.11 -0.289 -4.48 -0.090 -1.32
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals -0.030 -0.43 0.056 0.69 -0.058 -0.91 0.126 2.18
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.130 -2.05 0.055 0.73 -0.199 -3.73 -0.102 -1.94
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.202 -3.37 0.030 0.42 -0.244 -4.71 -0.136 -2.87
Construction -0.127 -1.52 0.075 0.73 -0.176 -2.94 -0.034 -0.58
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -0.342 -5.85 -0.072 -1.03 -0.384 -7.92 -0.294 -6.16
Transport & Communication -0.085 -1.36 0.014 0.20 -0.102 -1.91 -0.026 -0.48
Banking & Finance 0.008 0.14 0.043 0.63 -0.038 -0.80 0.085 1.87
Public Administration, Education, Other -0.121 -2.10 0.021 0.31 -0.180 -3.82 -0.068 -1.47
Ci _ _ _ _ -0.068 -2.96 -0.030 -0.86
Cit _ _ _ _ -0.035 -2.95 -0.037 -2.61
Ci.(Union Membership) _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.046 -0.97
Cit .(Union Membership) _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.008 0.38
Constant 1.661 23.47 -0.340 -2.06 1.732 26.68 1.627 26.03
Adj R ² 0.399 _ 0.414 0.419
Notes
1. Hierarchical/ Unrestricted Standard Errors obtained using 250 "Wild Bootstrap" replications
2. All models, except Fixed effects, are inclusive of time dummies
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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   TABLE 7
                 Descriptive Statistics, Endogeneity Correction Terms (1991-1996), Males
                                Union Members                            Non-Union Members
Latent Effect Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ci 0.385 0.488 -0.408 0.449
Cit 0.281 0.414 -0.083 0.425
C²i 0.386 0.658 0.368 0.481
C²it 0.250 0.615 0.187 0.666
   TABLE 8
                 Descriptive Statistics, Endogeneity Correction Terms (1997-2002), Males
                                Union Members                            Non-Union Members
Latent Effect Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ci 0.194 0.317 -0.376 0.248
Cit 0.261 0.447 -0.061 0.395
C²i 0.138 0.278 0.203 0.152
C²it 0.267 0.655 0.159 0.642
   TABLE 9
                 Descriptive Statistics, Endogeneity Correction Terms (1991-1996), Females
                                Union Members                            Non-Union Members
Latent Effect Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ci 0.396 0.474 -0.400 0.327
Cit 0.394 0.451 -0.089 0.400
C²i 0.382 0.559 0.267 0.309
C²it 0.359 0.644 0.168 0.565
   TABLE 10
                 Descriptive Statistics, Endogeneity Correction Terms (1997-2002), Females
                                Union Members                            Non-Union Members
Latent Effect Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ci 0.207 0.267 -0.284 0.207
Cit 0.295 0.438 -0.099 0.436
C²i 0.114 0.175 0.124 0.104
C²it 0.279 0.595 0.200 0.648
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